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On approximations of nonzero-sum uniformly continuous ergodic stochastic games

100%
Nowak A. S.
Applicationes Mathematicae
|
1999
|
tom 26
|
nr 2
221-228
EN
We consider a class of uniformly ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with the expected average payoff criterion, a separable metric state space and compact metric action spaces. We assume that the payoff and transition probability functions are uniformly continuous. Our aim is to prove the existence of stationary ε-equilibria for that class of ergodic stochastic games. This theorem extends to a much wider class of stochastic games a result proven recently by Bielecki [2].
2
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Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems

100%
Karpowicz M.
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
|
2012
|
tom 22
|
nr 4
951-969
EN
This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem. An equilibrium design procedure is proposed and applied as an analytic tool in a study of mechanism design games. In the setting considered the well-known fact is demonstrated that gains from reaching a desired solution to a coordination problem in a Nash equilibrium point need not balance the overall costs of its implementation. However, it is also demonstrated how these costs can be distributed among the agents and related to the particular organization of interactions in the system. Finally, application of the developed framework in the field of Internet traffic engineering is presented.
3
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A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria

88%
Góngora P., Rosenblueth D.
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
|
2015
|
tom 25
|
nr 3
577-596
EN
Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games. Similarly, the well-known state-labeling algorithm used in model checking can be viewed as computing optimal paths on a Kripke structure, where each path has a minimum number of transitions. We exploit these similarities in a common generalization of extensive games and Kripke structures that we name “graph games”. By extending the Bellman-Ford algorithm for computing shortest paths, we obtain a model-checking algorithm for graph games with respect to formulas in an appropriate logic. Hence, when given a certain formula, our model-checking algorithm computes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (as opposed to simply determining whether or not a given collection of paths is a Nash equilibrium). Next, we develop a symbolic version of our model checker allowing us to handle larger graph games. We illustrate our formalism on the critical-path method as well as games with perfect information. Finally, we report on the execution time of benchmarks of an implementation of our algorithms.
4
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Nonzero-sum semi-Markov games with countable state spaces

88%
Połowczuk W.
Applicationes Mathematicae
|
2000
|
tom 27
|
nr 4
395-402
EN
We consider nonzero-sum semi-Markov games with a countable state space and compact metric action spaces. We assume that the payoff, mean holding time and transition probability functions are continuous on the action spaces. The main results concern the existence of Nash equilibria for nonzero-sum discounted semi-Markov games and a class of ergodic semi-Markov games with the expected average payoff criterion.
5
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Some remarks on equilibria in semi-Markov games

88%
Nowak A. S.
Applicationes Mathematicae
|
2000
|
tom 27
|
nr 4
385-394
EN
This paper is a first study of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum semi-Markov stochastic games. We consider the expected average payoff criterion under a strong ergodicity assumption on the transition structure of the games. The main result is an extension of the correlated equilibrium theorem proven for discounted (discrete-time) Markov games in our joint paper with Raghavan. We also provide an existence result for stationary Nash equilibria in the limiting average payoff semi-Markov games with state independent and nonatomic transition probabilities. A similar result was proven for discounted Markov games by Parthasarathy and Sinha.
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