Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
115-123
Opis fizyczny
Daty
wydano
2006
Twórcy
autor
- Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Hermann Foss gt. 6, 5007 Bergen, Norway
autor
- Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warszawa, Poland
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
DOI
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-9