Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

• Autorzy: Sjur Didrik Flåm , Andrzej Wieczorek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 71
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 115-123

Daty

wydano

2006

Twórcy

autor

Sjur Didrik Flåm

• Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Hermann Foss gt. 6, 5007 Bergen, Norway

autor

Andrzej Wieczorek

• Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warszawa, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc71-0-9