The Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Actual Knowledge

• Autorzy: Arkadiusz Wójcik
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Dynamic epistemic logic; logic of public announcements; knowledge representation; problem of logical omniscience; actual knowledge; epistemic change; multi-agent systems

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
• Czasopismo: Bulletin of the Section of Logic
• Rocznik: 2020
• Tom: 49
• Numer: 1

Daty

wydano

2020-03-30

Twórcy

autor

Arkadiusz Wójcik

• University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy, Department of Logic

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.18778/0138-0680.2020.04