Recognition rules in weighted majority games and their implications

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Kasprzyk
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper examines implications of different random recognition rules used to select proposal-makers on the payoffs of players participating in a weighted majority game. In particular, incentives to strategically alter the set of players by strategic splits or mergers are investigated.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A20: Multistage and repeated games
• 91B12: Voting theory

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 71
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 185-194

Daty

wydano

2006

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Kasprzyk

• Department of Mathematical Economy, Warsaw School of Economics, Al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc71-0-14