Values of majority voting games with distrust operators

• Autorzy: Marcin Malawski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

A distrust operator, describing a kind of agreement among a group of players, transforms any characteristic function game to another game. In this new game, a player from this group can legally access a coalition if and only if all players from the group do the same. A formula for the Shapley value of games obtained by applying distrust operators to one man-one vote majority voting games is given, and the cases in which such an "agreement" is profitable to its parties are discussed. We also prove two theorems concerning the limit behaviour of values of voting games with distrust operators when the number of players tends to infinity but the winning majority percentage remains constant.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A12: Cooperative games
• 91A06: n -person games, n > 2

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Applicationes Mathematicae
• Rocznik: 2002
• Tom: 29
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 117-126

Daty

wydano

2002

Twórcy

autor

Marcin Malawski

• Institute of Computer Science, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warszawa, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/am29-1-10