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Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

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Ramsey D., Szajowski K.

Banach Center Publications

2006

tom 71

nr 1

253-265

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

Ograniczanie wyników

1 Banach Center Publications

1 Ramsey D.

1 Szajowski K.

1 2006

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Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem