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Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game

100%

Matsuhisa T.

Mathematica Applicanda

2018

tom 46

nr 2

In this paper we investigate equilibriums in the Bayesian routing problem of the network game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [LNCS 1563, pp.404-413. Springer (1999)]. We treat epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium of social cost function in the network game. It highlights the role of common-knowledge on the users' individual conjectures on the others' selections of channels in the network game.Especially two notions of equilibria are presented in the Bayesian extension of the network game; expected delay equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium, such as each user maximizes own expectations of delay and social cost respectively. We show that the equilibria have the properties: If all users commonly know them, then the former equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium in the based KP-model and the latter equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium for social cost in the network game.Further the notion of price of anarchy is extended for rational expectations equilibriums in the models.

Core equivalence in economy under awareness

100%

Matsuhisa T.

Banach Center Publications

2006

tom 71

nr 1

227-235

The extended notion of pure exchange economy under uncertainty, called an economy with awareness structure, is presented, where each trader having strictly monotone preferences makes decision under his/her awareness and belief. We show an extension of the core equivalence theorem: The ex-post core coincides with the set of all generalized expectations equilibria in awareness for the economy.

Ograniczanie wyników

1 Banach Center Publications

1 Mathematica Applicanda

2 Matsuhisa T.

1 2018

1 2006

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Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game

Core equivalence in economy under awareness