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Production games, core deficit, duality and shadow prices

100%

Flåm S.

Banach Center Publications

2006

tom 71

nr 1

103-114

Considered here are production (or market) games with transferable utility. Prime objects are explicitly computable core solutions, or somewhat "deficit" versions of such, fully defined by shadow prices. Main arguments revolve around standard Lagrangian duality. A chief concern is to relax, or avoid, the commonplace assumption that all preferences and production possibilities be convex. Doing so, novel results are obtained about non-emptiness of the core, and about specific imputations therein.

Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

63%

Flåm S., Wieczorek A.

Banach Center Publications

2006

tom 71

nr 1

115-123

The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

Ograniczanie wyników

2 Banach Center Publications

2 Flåm S.

1 Wieczorek A.

2 2006

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Production games, core deficit, duality and shadow prices

Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players