Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game

• Autorzy: Takashi Matsuhisa
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper  we investigate equilibriums in the Bayesian routing problem  of the network game introduced by  Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [LNCS 1563, pp.404-413. Springer (1999)]. We treat epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium of social cost function in the network game. It  highlights the role of common-knowledge on  the users' individual conjectures on the others' selections of channels in the network game.Especially two notions of equilibria are presented in the Bayesian extension of the network game; expected delay equilibrium and  rational expectations equilibrium, such as each user maximizes own expectations of delay and social cost respectively.  We show that the  equilibria have the properties: If all users commonly know them, then the former equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium in the based KP-model  and the latter equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium for social cost in the network game.Further  the notion of price of anarchy is extended for rational expectations equilibriums in the models.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Bayesian routing game; Common-Knowledge; Conjecture, Expected delay equilibrium, Expected price of anarchy, Information partition, Nash equilibrium, Rational expectations equilibrium, Social costs

• Wydawca: Polish Mathematical Society
• Czasopismo: Mathematica Applicanda
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: 46
• Numer: 2

Daty

wydano

2018

online

2018-07-07

Twórcy

autor

Takashi Matsuhisa

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14708/ma.v46i2.6346