Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems

• Autorzy: Mikhail Krastanov , Rossen Rozenov
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

A well-known result in public economics is that capital income should not be taxed in the long run. This result has been derived using necessary optimality conditions for an appropriate dynamic Stackelberg game. In this paper we consider three models of dynamic taxation in continuous time and suggest a method for calculating their feedback Nash equilibria based on a sufficient condition for optimality. We show that the optimal tax on capital income is generally different from zero.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Optimal dynamic taxation; Differential games

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A23: Differential games
• 49K15: Problems involving ordinary differential equations
• 91B64: Macro-economic models (monetary models, models of taxation)
• 91A65: Hierarchical games

• Wydawca: De Gruyter Open
• Czasopismo: Open Mathematics
• Rocznik: 2009
• Tom: 7
• Numer: 4
• Strony: 757-774

Daty

wydano

2009-12-01

online

2009-10-31

Twórcy

autor

Mikhail Krastanov

• Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

autor

Rossen Rozenov

• Department of Mathematics and Informatics, Sofia University, Sofia, Bulgaria

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/s11533-009-0040-5