This paper is a first study of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum semi-Markov stochastic games. We consider the expected average payoff criterion under a strong ergodicity assumption on the transition structure of the games. The main result is an extension of the correlated equilibrium theorem proven for discounted (discrete-time) Markov games in our joint paper with Raghavan. We also provide an existence result for stationary Nash equilibria in the limiting average payoff semi-Markov games with state independent and nonatomic transition probabilities. A similar result was proven for discounted Markov games by Parthasarathy and Sinha.
Institute of Mathematics, Zielona Góra University of Technology, Podgórna 50, 65-246 Zielona Góra, Poland
Bibliografia
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