ArticleOriginal scientific text

Title

A game-theoretic model of social adaptation in an infinite population

Authors 1, 2

Affiliations

  1. Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ordona 21 , 01-237 Warszawa, Poland
  2. Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Poland

Abstract

The paper deals with the question of existence and properties of equilibrated distributions of individual characteristics in an infinite population. General game-theoretic methods are applied and special attention is focused on the case of fitness functions depending only on the distance of an individual characteristic from a reference point and from the mean characteristics. Iterative procedures leading to equilibrated distributions are also considered.

Keywords

prey-predator game, social adaptation, equilibrated distribution, infinite population, iterative process

Bibliography

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Pages:
417-430
Main language of publication
English
Received
1997-11-05
Accepted
1998-04-06
Published
1999
Exact and natural sciences