On a new solution concept for bargaining problems

• Autorzy: Tadeusz Radzik
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover, it satisfies a new desirable axiom, Equal Area Twisting. It is surprising that no standard solution of bargaining problems has this property. The solution considered can be generalized in a very natural and unique way to n-person bargaining problems.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

twisting; bargaining solution; bargaining problem; average pay-off solution

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Applicationes Mathematicae
• Rocznik: 1998-1999
• Tom: 25
• Numer: 3
• Strony: 285-294

Daty

wydano

1998

otrzymano

1996-06-13

poprawiono

1997-11-28

Twórcy

autor

Tadeusz Radzik

• Institute of Mathematics, Technical University of Wrocław, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

Bibliografia

• N. Ambarci (1995), Reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining, Canad. J. Econom. 28, 675-682.
• E. Kalai and M. Smorodinsky (1975), Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problems, Econometrica 43, 513-518.
• J. F. Nash (1950), The bargaining problem, ibid. 28, 155-162.
• W. Thomson (1995), Cooperative models of bargaining, in: R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. II, North-Holland, 1237-1284.
• W. Thomson and R. B. Myerson (1980), Monotonicity and independence axioms, Internat. J. Game Theory 9, 37-49.