Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

• Autorzy: György Szabó
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading mechanisms of cooperation.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91B72: Spatial models
• 91A22: Evolutionary games

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: 80
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 197-215

Daty

wydano

2008

Twórcy

autor

György Szabó

• Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, POB. 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc80-0-10