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2006 | 71 | 1 | 275-290
Tytuł artykułu

A graph-theoretic characterization of the core in a homogeneous generalized assignment game

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Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
An exchange network is a socioeconomic system in which any two actors are allowed to negotiate and conclude a transaction if and only if their positions-mathematically represented by the points of a connected graph-are joined by a line of this graph. A transaction consists in a bilaterally agreed-on division of a profit pool assigned to a given line. Under the one-exchange rule, every actor is permitted to make no more than one transaction in each negotiation round. Bienenstock and Bonacich ([1]) proposed to represent a one-exchange network with an n-person game in characteristic function form. A special case, known as a two-sided assignment game, was studied earlier by Shapley and Shubik ([10]) who proved that the game representing any one-exchange network has a nonempty core if the underlying graph is bipartite. This paper offers a graph-theoretic criterion for the existence of a nonempty core in the game associated with an arbitrary not necessarily bipartite homogeneous one-exchange network where network homogeneity means that every line of the transaction opportunity graph is assigned a profit pool of the same size.
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
71
Numer
1
Strony
275-290
Opis fizyczny
Daty
wydano
2006
Twórcy
  • Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University, 52 Grodzka, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.bwnjournal-article-doi-10_4064-bc71-0-23
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