Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

• Autorzy: David M. Ramsey , Krzysztof Szajowski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 71
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 253-265

Daty

wydano

2006

Twórcy

autor

David M. Ramsey

• Instytut Matematyki Politechniki Wrocławskiej, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

autor

Krzysztof Szajowski

• Instytut Matematyki Politechniki Wrocławskiej, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc71-0-21