Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players

• Autorzy: J. Miękisz
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing symmetric games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A10: Noncooperative games
• 91A22: Evolutionary games
• 92D15: Problems related to evolution
• 92D25: Population dynamics (general)

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 71
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 237-242

Daty

wydano

2006

Twórcy

autor

J. Miękisz

• Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc71-0-19