Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility

• Autorzy: Milan Mareš
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases are described in the paper and approaches to including them into the game model are analyzed. An attempt to unify both cases into one uniform model is discussed as well.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A12: Cooperative games
• 03E72: Fuzzy set theory

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Banach Center Publications
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 71
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 213-225

Daty

wydano

2006

Twórcy

autor

Milan Mareš

• Institute of Information Theory and Automation, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, P.O. Box 18, 182 08 Praha 8, Czech Republic

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/bc71-0-17