Equilibria in constrained concave bimatrix games

• Autorzy: Wojciech Połowczuk , Tadeusz Radzik
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We study a generalization of bimatrix games in which not all pairs of players' pure strategies are admissible. It is shown that under some additional convexity assumptions such games have equilibria of a very simple structure, consisting of two probability distributions with at most two-element supports. Next this result is used to get a theorem about the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with a possibility of payoffs equal to -∞. The first of these results is a discrete counterpart of the Debreu Theorem about the existence of pure noncooperative equilibria in n-person constrained infinite games. The second one completes the classical theorem on the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. A wide discussion of the results is given.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91A10: Noncooperative games
• 91A05: 2-person games
• 91B52: Special types of equilibria

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Applicationes Mathematicae
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: 40
• Numer: 2
• Strony: 167-182

Daty

wydano

2013

Twórcy

autor

Wojciech Połowczuk

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

autor

Tadeusz Radzik

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/am40-2-2