Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces

• Autorzy: Andrzej Wieczorek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria and present a minimization problem and a complementarity problem (both nonlinear) whose solutions are exactly the same as equilibria in the given game. Examples of applications include a model of social adaptation and a model of economic efficiency enforced by taxation.

Kategorie tematyczne

• 91B24: Price theory and market structure
• 91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
• 91A10: Noncooperative games
• 91A40: Game-theoretic models
• 91D25: Spatial models
• 91A13: Games with infinitely many players

• Wydawca: Institute of Mathematics Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Applicationes Mathematicae
• Rocznik: 2005
• Tom: 32
• Numer: 2
• Strony: 183-193

Daty

wydano

2005

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Wieczorek

• Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warszawa, Poland

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.4064/am32-2-6